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1 Introduction
Let them hate me, as long as they fear me.
Caligula, Roman Emperor from 37 to 41 AD.
At some point in the second half of the 20th century, the world was in a state of excitement.
The reason was that the white government of an African country had just announced the
discharge of a prominent freedom fighter with a history within the South African ANC.
After decades of tireless struggle for freedom and majority rule, he was convincingly
elected to lead his country. Despite past grievances, he advocated reconciliation between
blacks and whites upon assuming presidency - a position that he started to fulfill with
success. This didn’t go unnoticed and the freedom-fighter-turned-politician was soon
inundated with international honours (including a knighthood by Queen Elizabeth II in
1994). His name, however, wasn’t Nelson Mandela. It was Robert Mugabe.
Anno 2016 the above paragraph may be hard to believe, but upon installation in
1980 (and even during his early years) Mugabe was regarded as a benevolent and highly
competent ruler of his country - a view that was widely shared among Zimbabweans, non-
Zimbabweans, and international organizations.1 During the 1980s, Mugabe’s government
also achieved impressive successes: the country saw double-digit growth rates, high school
enrolment rates increased from 2 percent to 70 percent, while literacy rates rose from 45
percent to 80 percent. Because of his contributions to reconciliation, Mugabe was even
short-listed for the Nobel Peace Prize in the 1980s (Nordlinger, 2012: 243).
By the late 2000s, however, things had gone horribly wrong: over 90 percent of all
Zimbabweans were unemployed, a fifth of them HIV-positive, and about 25 percent of
the population had fled the country to look for a better life elsewhere. Many of those
remaining in Zimbabwe lived under great fear and repression, with Mugabe stating in a
2003 speech that he would act like “a black Hitler tenfold” against any opposition. In
order to finance the military, excessive money creation made inflation soar to 231 million
percent in 2008. GDP per capita in the late 2000s was less than half of what it was back
in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, life expectancy for Zimbabwean men fell from 58 years in
1On September 5 1986, The New York Times for example wrote in an editorial that “Zimbabwe under
Mr. Mugabe’s leadership remains one of Africa’s success stories (...) His sensible economic policies have
kept the country’s key agricultural sector healthy. His responsible treatment of the white remnants of
colonial Rhodesia has checked the flight of a skilled minority. Even the debilitating relations between
black tribes seem to be less tense”. When Mugabe won the Hunger Project Prize in 1988, he was
credited with turning Zimbabwe into the “agricultural success story” of Africa, with his agricultural
programs “[pointing] the way not only for Zimbabwe but for the entire African continent”.
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1991 to 45 years in 2006. Female life expectancy nearly halved from 61 years in 1991 to
no more than 34 years in 2006 (Holland, 2008: xxi).
In this paper, we ask how it is possible that someone who looked to be a promising
ruler during his early years,2 subsequently became a dreaded tyrant. Any explanation
for such a development should also address why someone who is off to a promising start,
would ever choose to do wrong in the first place. This seems to be a pattern: next to the
curious case of Robert Mugabe, there are many more examples of promising leaders who
later turned into vicious dictators (see the Appendix to this paper).
At the exact same time, history also offers examples of dictators who started off in an
unpromising (and even malevolent) manner, but showed remarkable improvements in their
actions over time. The archetype along these lines is Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2011: 218-222). Immediately after taking power in December 1981,
he began a wave of oppression through killings, arrests, and torture, while he simulta-
neously ended free press. Subsequently, however, Rawlings was rapidly confronted with
rising unrest among the local population (as well as with pressure from the international
community). This turned him into, what Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011: 222) call,
“a reluctant democrat”. Notwithstanding his questionable motives, Rawlings had become
a poster boy for the IMF and World Bank by the early 1990s and was credited with play-
ing a key role in Ghanaian development. In December 2000, Rawlings stepped down per
his own constitutional mandate (he had served for two terms) and made room for the
democratically elected John Kufuor, his main rival and opponent in the 1996 election. In
doing so, Rawlings established the first peaceful transition of power in Ghana since the
country’s independence in 1957.3
Again, Rawlings is not the only case of a dictator whose behavior mutated for the
better and some other examples are described in the Appendix.
This paper presents a new theory (focused on explaining the use of repression) which
2That is not to say that Mugabe had a flawless start. While the consensus view is that he did more
good than harm during the first ten years of his reign, it certainly was not all good from the beginning:
he for example already repressed certain political opponents during the 1980s (see especially Godwin
(2010)), although it has been argued that the underlying conflict was actually fuelled by external forces
(South Africa’s apartheid regime in particular, see footnote 4 below). What does seem undisputed is that
Mugabe’s behavior deteriorated significantly over time, which is the focus of this paper.
3On Rawlings’ remarkable story, also see The Guardian of January 5, 2001. There it is written that
“in 1981 Jerry Rawlings gained power in a coup. For years (...) he allowed opponents to be persecuted
and murdered. Then at the beginning of the 90s, he changed. He allowed democratic elections and gave
citizens a liberal constitution. This has now prevented him from holding office for a third term. And [he]
kept to this”. Similarly The New York Times of January 9, 2009 notes that “Africa’s vast stage has seen
many complex players, but few match the contradictions of Mr. Rawlings, the ruthless military man who
seized power at the age of 31 and then oversaw the summary executions of his rivals, only to later usher
in a new era of prosperity and democracy. Mr. Rawlings (...) was an unlikely savior”.
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is able to rationalize these remarkable mutations - both for the better, as well as for the
worse. We will show that such transformations can arise without having to allude to a
sudden exogenous change in the dictator’s preferences.
In our model, citizens are able to oust a dictator via a revolution, but the dictator
can reduce the probability of being overthrown by exercising repression (which can take
the form of restricting freedom of speech, imprisoning or executing opponents, and so
forth). Particularly motivated by recent events in Northern Africa, where various dictators
were overthrown, we allow revolutions to succeed. Herewith, we relax the often-made
assumption that revolutions do not occur in equilibrium (see e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006, Ch. 6, 11) and Guimaraes and Sheedy (2013) on this assumption).
A key ingredient underlying our results is a complementarity between a dictator’s
flow-use of repression and his “stock of past wrongdoings” (a novel concept that will play
a central role): when a dictator has committed wrongs in the past (of whatever form), he
fears retribution for these bygone offences once overthrown and he becomes more willing
to use repression (so as to reduce his probability of being ousted, and hence punished).
Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that this mechanism has played an important role
in explaining the use of repression for many of the aforementioned cases. Asked what has
happened to Mugabe’s heart, his ex-spin doctor Jonathan Moyo for example notes that
“Gukurahundi4 (...) is hanging over Robert Mugabe’s head, partly explaining his desire -
or his need - to continue in office until he dies” (Holland, 2008: 183). For similar reasons,
Godwin (2010: 122) highlights the view that Mugabe is a “prisoner of his own past”
and also quotes the Zimbabwean politician Roy Bennett as saying that “[Gukurahundi]
remains Mugabe’s biggest motive for holding on to power: he fears that if he leaves office
he will become victim to (...) retributive justice, the real blood-revenge.”
We will show that such stock-flow complementarity in wrongdoings leads to the emer-
gence of two steady states: one is characterized by light repression, while the other steady
state comes with heavy repression. As a result, our model can give rise to significant
deteriorations in dictator-behavior, but also to remarkable improvements. It can do so
without having to resort to equilibrium-multiplicity; our model only features multiple
steady states - the equilibrium remains unique (thereby preventing “anything” from hap-
pening). Interestingly, our model also implies that any individual rising to power has the
potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a dreaded tyrant.
4“Gukurahundi” refers to the killing of supporters of Mugabe’s rival Joshua Nkomo during the 1980s
for which Mugabe is held responsible. There is evidence that this conflict was actually fuelled by South
Africa’s apartheid regime in an attempt to destabilize Zimbabwe. See e.g. “Apartheid’s Spies” in The
Washington Post of October 22, 1989.
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Although this mechanism can account for the derailment of leaders who have burned
their hands in the past (while it is simultaneously, and more surprisingly, also able to
explain why some of these leaders improved their behavior over the years), it raises a
puzzling question as well: why does a rational leader ever choose to burn his hands for the
first time? We will show that he may be inclined to do this when he has imperfect foresight
on his ability to “get away” with non-congruent actions (i.e.: actions that the leader wishes
to implement for personal reasons, despite the fact that the public disapproves of them).
In this respect, some leaders are able to push their own interests further than others.
When a leader is uncertain on how far he can go, it may become rational for him to
experiment along this dimension - even though he realizes that this puts him at risk of
derailment (which actually makes the dictator worse off as we will see later on). In the
words of T.S. Eliot: “Only those who will risk going too far can possibly find out how
far one can go.” Consequently, it is worth emphasizing that all results in this paper are
driven by an interaction between the aforementioned complementarity, and the dictator’s
inclination to experiment (which stems from the fact that he is uncertain on how far
he can push his own interests). We will show that this can explain how some agents
rationally end up in a situation which they will regret ex-post.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out our model and
describes its key properties, after which Section 3 will explain how this setup can give
rise to significant mutations in dictator-behavior. In doing so, we will discuss the factors
that determine whether a particular ruler will develop into a moderate leader, or into a
vicious tyrant. Section 4 then analyzes some policy implications, after which Sections 5
and 6 will discuss and conclude, respectively.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
Our model’s structure is related to that of the drug addiction-model of Orphanides and
Zervos (1995). It has an infinite horizon, is set in discrete time, and hosts an incumbent,
non-accountable dictator who discounts the future with factor β. As argued in Maskin
and Tirole (2004), such non-accountable officials are inclined to act in a way that is non-
congruent with the preferences of society (so in the language of Hess and Orphanides
(2001), the dictator is only “partially benevolent”). The reason is that the absence of an
election mechanism implies that the public has relatively little means available through
which it can ensure that the dictator acts in the public - as opposed to his private -
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interest (apart from trying to remove a dictator via a revolution, which is an option that
we discuss below). We model the non-congruence by assuming that the dictator obtains
utility u(ct, ·) by extracting ct rents from his country, for example through corruption.
This is similar to Besley (2004: 201), who models non-congruent policy makers as ones
who “obtain private benefits from deviating from the voters’ preferred policy”, for example
because they are “willing to accept bribes”. Simultaneously, however, such rent extraction
creates discontent among the population, and may trigger a revolution (see below).5
Next to his private consumption level ct, the dictator also controls the amount of
repression that he is going to impose upon his population (rt).
6 This variable can be
set independently from ct. We define “repression” as a technology that makes the afore-
mentioned revolution less likely to succeed,7 while we also allow for the possibility that
the dictator is sadistic and enjoys direct utility from implementing repressive policies.
Consequently, the dictator’s period utility function reads u(ct, rt; ρ), where ρ ≥ 0 is a
parameter that governs the dictator’s degree of sadism (with ρ = 0 representing a non-
sadistic dictator whose utility function is simply given by u(ct)). We will take this utility
function to be twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave in both
of its arguments.
The amount of divertible funds available to the dictator in any period is denoted by z.
These funds can for example stem from the exploitation of natural resources, or from the
5As argued in Svolik (2012: 10), pursuing policies through which public consent is lost, always tends to
be the “original sin” of dictatorships. Often, this original sin is rent extraction, think about the notable
examples of the Roman Emperor Nero (who lost credit when he increased taxes to finance his “Golden
House”), Kwame Nkrumah (he expropriated cocoa farmers, which led to violent insurgencies against his
regime), and Ferdinand Marcos (the first protests that he faced, the so-called “First Quarter Storm”,
were triggered by the corruption in his government). More generally, one can think of ct as representing
any non-congruent policy that the dictator wants to pursue for private reasons, even though it generates
dissatisfaction among the population. It could also include military actions that a dictator has to take
to land in power and/or stabilize the country. While such actions could be approved by the public in the
“fog of war”, they may be perceived less favorably later on.
6Besley and Persson (2011) distinguish between “repression” (which they define as the government
using one-sided violence against a non-violent opposition) and “civil war” (in which case the opposition
answers by using violence as well). Since we do not need to take a stand on the nature of the opposition
(violent or non-violent?), this distinction becomes of subordinate importance to our model. Our model
does distinguish between “peace” on the one hand, and “repression/civil war” on the other though.
7We thank a referee for pointing us to the large literature examining the relationship between re-
pression and dissent (Snyder (1976), Lichbach (1987), Gupta, Singh, and Sprague (1993), Rasler (1996),
Moore (1998) and Carey (2006)). The empirical findings of these studies are mixed – hinting at the
existence of non-linearities. We acknowledge that repression could lead to an increase in anger among the
populace which can actually reduce the dictator’s chances of survival. In that case, our (rational) dictator
would never choose to implement such policies. Given that we are focusing on autocracies, we make the
assumption that we are in the range of repression where “anger gives way to fear” (see Lichbach (1987)
and Carey (2006)). Consequently, an increase in repression succeeds in bringing down the probability
with which the revolt succeeds (and the dictator may become willing to use this strategy).
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reception of fungible development aid. We take z to be constant over time, as making it
stochastic or time-varying does not yield many interesting insights (but see Section 4 for
some comparative statics with respect to this variable). The dictator’s budget constraint
is then given by (we assume that the relative price equals unity, but this is of course
without loss of generality):
ct + rt ≤ z (1)
Since we are not interested in explaining asset accumulation of dictators, we keep the
model as simple (and parsimonious in terms of state variables) as possible by denying the
dictator the opportunity to save any of his period endowment (but this assumption is not
material to any of our results).
Once citizens find it worthwhile to revolt (a decision that we will discuss shortly), the
dictator faces a probability pt = p(rt) > 0 of being ousted in period t. This function
satisfies dp(rt)/drt < 0, capturing the idea that a dictator can reduce the probability of
being overthrown at time t by repressing his population during that period.
Both the consumption of rents c as well as the use of repression r however generate
dissatisfaction among the population. By carrying out such activities, a dictator may
therefore trigger the start of a revolution, while he may also face corresponding punishment
(if overthrown). Consequently, the combined stock of exercised repression and extracted
rents (S) will serve as a state variable. We refer to this novel concept as the dictator’s
“stock of wrongdoings” and it evolves according to:
St+1 = δSt + rt + χct (2)
Here δ ∈ (0, 1) governs the depreciation rate (a lower value for δ implies that past
wrongdoings are forgiven, or forgotten, at a faster pace),8 while χ ≥ 0 is the exchange
rate converting units of rent extraction into units of repression (when χ < 1 extracting a
unit of rents is seen as less malicious than exercising a unit of repression, and vice versa).
8In reality, δ seems to be smaller than 1. This is partly due to statutes of limitations, but crimes
also seem to be forgiven/forgotten over time: recall how Muammar Gaddafi was re-embraced by many
countries in the early 2000s, while Rawlings, Moi, and many others were never prosecuted for their past
alleged misdeeds. The ordinary public also seems to forgive/forget: Joseph Stalin’s popularity among
Russians has risen with time, while Kwame Nkrumah was voted “Africa’s man of the millennium” in
2000. As a referee pointed out, the rate at which a crime is forgiven/forgotten may also depend upon
the nature of a crime. This can be modeled by distinguishing between the stock of rent extraction C
and the stock of repression R and applying different discount factors to the two stocks. Then, St =
Rt + χCt, Rt+1 = δRRt + rt, Ct+1 = δCCt + ct, where having δC < δR captures the idea that rent
extraction (c) is more easily forgiven/forgotten than repression (r). Allowing for this generalization does
not affect any of the results central to this paper.
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This state variable plays a dual role in our model. Firstly, once overthrown a dictator
is punished according to the unforgotten/unforgiven stock of wrongdoings undertaken in
the past. Secondly, citizens will use the accumulated stock S to determine whether they
find it worthwhile to start a revolution against the incumbent dictator.9
In particular, let us use S∗ to denote the value of S beyond which (part of) the popu-
lation starts a revolution.10 The exact location of this tipping point is affected by factors
ranging from culture (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2014) to geography (Campante, Do,
and Guimaraes, 2013). However, the quality of institutions is an important determinant
as well. Better institutions place tighter constraints on the executive (cf. how only democ-
racies tend to provide legitimate channels for voicing dissent; Regan and Henderson (2002)
and Carey (2010)) – thereby lowering the value of S∗. Under the simplifying assumption
that lowering the location of the tipping point is costless, citizens would evidently like
to set S∗ as low as possible. Consequently, S∗ may be thought of as the lowest value of
the tipping point that civilians can choose, given the relevant exogenous factors – such
as culture and geography. (Obviously, when we assume that reducing the position of the
tipping point is costly, S∗ would be left at a higher location; in that sense, S∗ can be seen
as an absolute lower bound.)
We use the term “revolution” very broadly here and allow it to encompass all actions
that citizens can undertake with the aim of overthrowing the incumbent. These actions
could be either violent or non-violent, so “opposition” is another appropriate label. With
some abuse of terminology, we will call the point S∗ “the Mogadishu line”.11 From that
point onwards, the dictator faces a period ousting probability equal to p(rt), which he
can reduce by exercising repression (remember that dp(rt)/drt < 0 and recall that our
9One could also introduce a third role for S by using a more general ousting probability function of
the form p(St, rt), with ∂p(St, rt)/∂St > 0. This would capture the idea that the public becomes more
eager to bring about regime change, or that a larger fraction of the population joins the revolution, if the
dictator’s accumulated stock of wrongdoings is bigger. For simplicity we employ p(rt), but our results
are fully robust to using the more general p(St, rt).
10If we were to microfound S∗, this would be the level of S beyond which it would be optimal for citizens
to start revolting, taking all future possibilities (which include derailment, disciplining, and ousting of the
dictator) into account. Since modeling this group-decision is non-trivial due to the presence of a collective-
action problem (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006: Ch. 5) and a need to specify how the public believes that
the dictator will react to any opposition, we take a short-cut here - choosing to highlight (and microfound)
the behavior of the dictator instead. For our mechanism to operate, the only important element is that
there is a threshold - how exactly it comes about is of subordinate importance. Most existing models of
revolutions, such as the seminal ones by Roemer (1985), Grossman (1991), and Wintrobe (1998), take a
similar approach on this dimension.
11Formally, the concept of “the Mogadishu line” refers to the point where a foreign power abandons a
pure peacekeeping mission in a particular country and begins combat operations instead, often with the
aim of bringing about regime change. In this paper, we will use the term more generally so that it also
includes the mobilization of a local opposition that wants to overthrow the incumbent regime.
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results are robust to using the more general function p(St, rt), with ∂p(St, rt)/∂St > 0
and ∂p(St, rt)/∂rt < 0; cf. footnote 9).
The fact that the revolution only starts once St > S
∗, results from the notion that
individuals need to pay a fixed start-up cost to form an opposition-movement.12 This
feature of our model ensures that dictators can get away with some wrongdoing, which
seems to be in line with reality: a revolution only arises once the public’s assessment of
the dictator gets “bad enough”.13 Agents in our model thus look at a dictator’s past per-
formance in determining whether they find it worthwhile to revolt, which seems realistic
and is somewhat analogous to the concept of retrospective voting (and note that such
backward-looking behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with rationality; cf. Rogoff and
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Alesina and Cukierman (1990)).
The exact location of the Mogadishu line S∗, a tipping point beyond which a revolution
mobilizes, is however unknown to the dictator (and see Kuran (1989) for evidence that
the locations of such points are indeed surrounded by uncertainty). Consequently, the
dictator is unsure about how much of the utility-generating non-congruent policy (in our
setup: how much rent extraction) he can get away with, which is why he may choose to
experiment along this dimension. Uncertainty on the location of the tipping point implies
that there is a chance that initial wrongdoings will remain unpunished. Consequently,
a dictator may become willing to “burn his hands” for the first time – even though he
anticipates that this could lead to ex-post regret (since initial wrongdoings can perpetuate
future ones, as will become clear later on).
The position of S∗ is only revealed to the dictator once his actual stock St crosses
S∗, as he then observes the mobilization of an opposition-movement. If he observes no
opposition at time t, the dictator learns that S∗ > St and he updates his prior belief on
the location of S∗ accordingly using Bayes’ rule. Summarizing the dictator’s prior belief
about the location of S∗ with the c.d.f. F (S∗), this implies that if S∗ has not yet been
reached at the point where the stock of wrongdoings equals S, the distribution is updated
12See e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (1999), Cabrales and Hauk (2011), and Fearon (2011) for similar
models. One could also allow for an exogenous positive probability of the dictator losing power while
St < S
∗ without affecting our results. That specification would make this case correspond to the state
of peace identified by Besley and Persson (2011): in their peace-regime there is also no repression or
revolution occurring, but the incumbent does face an exogenous probability of losing power.
13American “Founding Father” John Adams already noted this in his Papers, where he wrote that
“people are so little attentive to government that there are no instances of resistance until repeated,
multiplied oppressions have placed it beyond a doubt that their rulers had formed settled plans to deprive
them of their liberties” (Adams, 1977 [1775]: 231).
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to F ′(S∗) via (see Zeira (1987, 1999)):
F ′(S∗) =
F (S∗)− F (S)
1− F (S) (3)
Without loss of generality, F (·) will be the uniform c.d.f. with support [0, Smax].
In this paper we model the Mogadishu line S∗ as being exogenous, but this is not
essential. One could for example also endogenize S∗ by making it depend on r, without
affecting the core findings that are to follow. All that matters for the main results is that
there is a threshold S∗ and that its exact location is unknown.
As a result of our model’s information structure, the dictator’s behavior is character-
ized by two value functions. After the dictator has crossed the Mogadishu line S∗, its
location is revealed through the start of a visible revolution and the learning process stops.
Assuming that the opposition-movement stays active ever after it has incurred the fixed
start-up cost, crossing the tipping point is an irreversible event and the “post-tipping”
value function V1 is given by:
V1(S) = u(c, r)− p(r)Ψ(S) + [1− p(r)] βV1(S ′), (4)
where non-primed variables refer to the current period, while primed variables apply
to the next period. If the dictator is ousted in the current period (which happens with
probability p(r)), he incurs a punishment Ψ which is increasing in his accumulated stock
of unforgiven/unforgotten wrongdoings (so dΨ(S)/dS > 0).
As long as S < S∗ the dictator hasn’t crossed the Mogadishu line yet, so he is uncertain
on the exact location of S∗. The dictator therefore uses his beliefs F (S∗) to construct
expected values. The pre-tipping value function V0 can then be written as:
V0(S, F ) = u(c, r) + β [(1− q(S ′, S))V0(S ′, F ′) + q(S ′, S)V1(S ′, F ′)] , (5)
where q(S ′, S) expresses the dictator’s belief that S∗ is located in the (S, S ′)-interval
(i.e. that S∗ ∈ (S, S ′)). This belief is defined by:
q(S ′, S) ≡ Pr [S∗ ∈ (S, S ′)] = F (S ′)− F (S) (6)
Hence, q(S ′, S) represents the subjective probability that the dictator attaches to
switching to the post-tipping regime if he chooses to set next period’s stock of accumu-
lated wrongdoings equal to S ′ (with his current stock being equal to S). Through this
mechanism a dictator realizes that by committing any wrongs in the current period, he
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loses popularity and hence increases the probability that he will be ousted in the future.14
This completes the description of our model’s setup.
2.2 Solution
The model can be solved through value-function iteration. Moreover, when the dictator
has sadistic preferences (i.e.: when ρ > 0) and when rent extraction does not feed into
the stock S (i.e.: when χ = 0), it is possible to establish some important properties of the
solution analytically. This is possible thanks to Lemma 1, which enables us to reduce our
problem to a problem which has been solved before.
Lemma 1. When ρ > 0 and χ = 0, the budget constraint (1) will hold with equality
in the post-tipping regime.
Proof. In this case, the post-tipping problem reads:
V1(S) = max
c,r
u(c, r)− p(r)Ψ(S) + [1− p(r)] βV1(S ′)
s.t. S ′ = δS + r
z ≥ c+ r
The Lagrangian can thus be formulated as:
L = u(c, r)− p(r)Ψ(S) + [1− p(r)] βV1(S ′)− λ [c+ r − z]− µ [δS + r − S ′]
From the first-order conditions it follows that:
∂L
∂c
=
∂u
∂c
− λ = 0,
which implies that λ = ∂u/∂c > 0, hence the constraint binds.
By using Lemma 1, we can eliminate the budget constraint from our post-tipping prob-
lem by defining v(c) ≡ u(c, z − c). Consequently, the post-tipping dynamic programming
problem can be written as:
V1(S) = max
c∈[0,z]
{v(c)− p(z − c)Ψ(S) + [1− p(z − c)] βV1(S ′)} (7)
s.t. S ′ = δS + z − c
14Niccolo` Machiavelli also alluded to this in The Prince, where he wrote: “Never do any enemy a small
injury for they are like a snake which is half beaten and it will strike back the first chance it gets”.
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This casts our model back into the general framework of Orphanides and Zervos (1994,
1995), which enables us to establish the equivalents of Propositions 1-6 in Orphanides and
Zervos (1995). Since their Propositions 3-6 are of subordinate importance to our paper,
we only repeat our equivalents of their first two propositions here (Proposition 1 dealing
with existence and uniqueness, while Proposition 2 establishes important characteristics
of the model’s steady state(s)):
Proposition 1. There exists a unique and continuous value function V1(S) that
satisfies (7), as well as a nonempty, upper semicontinuous policy correspondence which
describes the optimal evolution of the stock:
Φ(S) = {S ′ : V1(S) = v(c)− p(z − c)Ψ(S) + [1− p(z − c)] βV1(S ′)}
Proof. See Orphanides and Zervos (1995).
Proposition 2. For a dictator in the post-tipping regime, (i) optimal paths converge
monotonically to a steady state, (ii) if the stock at the time-of-tipping resides between two
consecutive steady states, then the optimal paths converge to one or the other, and (iii)
there is exactly one critical level between any two consecutive stable steady states.
Proof. See Orphanides and Zervos (1994).
When ρ = 0 and/or χ > 0, Lemma 1 no longer applies and the Propositions in this
section can not be proved. Extensive numerical analysis however strongly suggests that
they continue to apply.
The global monotonicity underlying the optimal evolution of the stock S allows for a
simple graphical illustration of the post-tipping policy function, an example of which can
be found in Figure 1. From it, the steady-state multiplicity stands out. To understand this
important feature of our model, note from the post-tipping value function V1 (equation
(4)) that the stock of wrongdoings and the flow of repression are complements. Defining
g(c, r, S) ≡ u(c, r)− p(r)Ψ(S) as the dictator’s period felicity function in the post-tipping
regime, it holds that:
∂2g(c, r, S)
∂r∂S
= −dp(r)
dr
dΨ(S)
dS
> 0, (8)
as dp(r)/dr < 0 (a dictator can reduce the probability with which he is ousted by
exercising repression), while dΨ(S)/dS > 0 (punishment is increasing in the stock of
accumulated wrongdoings). This shows that marginal utility from exercising repression
is higher for a dictator with a large stock of wrongdoings hanging over his head - thereby
12
making it more likely that such a dictator will do further wrongs (in the form of repressing
his population, as that reduces the probability that he will indeed face punishment).
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the post-tipping policy function for u(c) = log(c), ρ = 0, p(r) =
1
1+exp(κr)
, Ψ(S) = S, β = 0.95, δ = 0.6, χ = 0.6, κ = 0.073, and z = 50.
As set out in a general setup by Orphanides and Zervos (1994), this complementarity
leads to a multiplicity of steady states. In our setting, this multiplicity is driven by a
discontinuity in the dictator’s post-tipping policy function.15 Denoting the location of
the discontinuity by SD, we will show in Section 3 that this stock SD is going to act like
a critical point in our model - generating two steady states for the stock of wrongdoings
S in the post-tipping regime.
Intuition for this multiplicity can be gained by realizing that all that the dictator
cares about, is the product p(r)Ψ(S) (recall equation (4)). Due to the complementarity
between S and r, there is one steady state where both S and r are high (the former
making prospective punishment Ψ(S) high, while the latter reduces the probability of it
15As noted by Orphanides and Zervos (1994), existence of the discontinuity is not guaranteed, but its
presence is not essential: they show that the steady-state multiplicity also arises when the policy function
is continuous (as one then obtains an S-shaped policy function, yielding an unstable intermediate steady
state acting like a critical point). In all cases with steady-state multiplicity that we have looked at, the
discontinuity is present.
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actually materializing p(r) - such that the product p(r)Ψ(S) remains contained). The
other steady state is characterized by the co-existence of a low S and r. In that case,
prospective punishment Ψ(S) is already low, as a result of which there is no need to
ensure a low p(r) by setting a high r. Which steady state the model will end up in, is
fully determined by the ranking of SD relative to S∗ (see Section 3). Consequently, the
equilibrium of our model remains unique (despite the steady-state multiplicity).
As pointed out by Orphanides and Zervos (1995), further analytical results are scarce
in these kind of models but progress can be made by analyzing limit cases. For our setting,
a useful limit case is the one in which a dictator holds the belief that there is no tipping
point. In that case, our optimization problem becomes purely static and can be solved
analytically. Since the dictator in this case believes that there is absolutely no chance
that he will ever be overthrown via a revolution (either now or in the future), he will
always choose to exhaust his budget constraint (2) by setting c = z. The accompanying
steady-state stock equals S
U
= χz/(1− δ), where the superscript U indicates that this is
the unconstrained steady state.
A decision maker who believes that there may exist an unpleasant tipping point at
some bounded location (i.e. someone who believes that S∗ <∞ is possible, but is unsure
on its exact position), will behave more cautiously (see Zeira (1987) and imagine the
speed at which a blind man would walk towards his goal if he knew that there might
be a cliff somewhere in front of him). In our environment, this implies that the dictator
will choose to extract less rents in the pre-tipping regime compared to the unconstrained
case, increasing his stock S only little-by-little as he is afraid to cross S∗ (such caution
is also apparent from Figures 2 and 3 below). Due to this more cautious behavior, the
model will settle down at a lower steady state S
C
< S
U
. It is not possible to solve for this
“constrained” steady state S
C
analytically, but it can be found numerically. The dotted
line in Figure 1 shows its location given parameters. The constrained steady state S
C
is useful as it characterizes the limit behavior of any dictator who becomes increasingly
optimistic that the possibility of a revolution is not going to generate a binding constraint
on him (i.e.: a dictator who starts to put more and more weight on the possibility that
S∗ > S
C
). Once his stock St reaches S
C
(without having triggered a revolution), the
system will settle down at this steady state.16
16To avoid clutter, Figure 1 does not contain the pre-tipping policy functions for dictators who believe
that either S∗ =∞ or that S∗ <∞. They are however just two continuous, upward-sloping lines crossing
the 45o-line at S
U
and S
C
, respectively.
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3 Simulation results
At this stage, we can gain further insights by simulating the choices that a dictator who
is placed in our model-environment will make. For reasons that are set out below, we
will start by considering a non-sadistic dictator with ρ = 0 (but the case where ρ > 0 is
analyzed later on). As will become clear in this section, the relative ranking of the critical
point (SD) and the Mogadishu line (S∗) becomes a key determinant of how the dictator
will act. Consequently, we distinguish between two cases.
Case I: SD < S∗. First consider Figure 2 (which is the simulation that follows
from Figure 1 and its calibration). The solid line in the top panel of this figure shows
the outcome of a typical simulation when the Mogadishu line S∗ is greater than the
critical point SD (but smaller than S
C
, so SD < S∗ < S
C
).17 The solid line shows that,
even though the dictator is not fully benevolent from the start due to his non-congruent
preferences,18 his behavior is still quite moderate during his early days (especially if one
considers what is about to follow). This characterization fits the cases of Robert Mugabe
and many others who were not perfect when they first came to power, but looked bearable
at least.
Uncertain on where exactly the Mogadishu line S∗ is located (and hence uncertain on
how much wrongdoing he can get away with before mobilizing the opposition), the dictator
continues to experiment by implementing his non-congruent interest. As can be inferred
from the bottom panel of Figure 2, the wrongdoings in the pre-tipping regime consist
entirely of rent extraction (the difference between the solid and the dashed line in Figure
2’s bottom panel equals χct, which is rent extraction converted to units of repression);
there is no repression yet. The reason is that in the model’s current formulation, the
dictator is non-sadistic (ρ = 0) and repression only starts delivering benefits after the
opposition has mobilized. Consequently, a dictator will never exercise any repression
as long as his stock S < S∗ and our model starts out in a state of peace. One could
let a dictator exercise repression while S < S∗ by assuming that any pre-tipping use of
repression pushes up the location of S∗, or by considering a sadistic ruler for whom ρ > 0
17Whenever exogenous factors are such that S∗ > S
C
, the tipping point is “non-binding” and the
dictator is able to reach his constrained steady state S
C
without triggering a revolution. This case is
illustrated by the dotted, circled curve in Figure 2 (this curve is actually more visible in Figure 3 below).
18Given our framing, the dictator starts by extracting rents. But as explained in footnote 5, one can
think of ct as representing any policy that the dictator wants to pursue for private reasons - even though
it creates dissatisfaction among the public. It could also be the case that external circumstances make
a dictator believe (rightly or wrongly) that he is somehow forced to take a non-congruent action. Some
might argue that this was the case for Robert Mugabe around Gukurahundi (recall footnote 4).
15
(see under Case II below). Those versions of the model yield similar results. In this
section we would however like to emphasize that even non-sadistic rulers can end up as
vicious tyrants.
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Figure 2: Evolution of key variables when SD < S∗. Parameters as in Figure 1.
From the top panel one can also see how the dictator’s behavior is moderated by
his belief that there may exist a binding tipping point (recall the end of Section 2 and
compare the start of the solid line in Figure 2’s top panel with the dashed line, which
would materialize if the dictator was certain that there was no tipping point). As the
revolution fails to materialize, our dictator becomes increasingly optimistic that he can get
away with extracting even more rents and he continues with his unlawful behavior.19 The
dictator hopes to be able to reach his constrained steady state S
C
without triggering a
revolution by continuing along his initial path (this case is illustrated by the dotted, circled
curve in the top panel of Figure 2 and would materialize if S∗ > S
C
, i.e. if the tipping
19Anecdotal evidence indeed suggests that this learning/experimentation process on how far one can
go, plays a role in reality. Holland (2008: 66) for example describes how Robert Mugabe started to
believe that “he could get away with anything” after Gukurahundi was left unpunished.
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point were “non-binding”).20 But when his stock of wrongdoings St eventually crosses
S∗ nevertheless (in our example this happens just before S
C
is reached), the opposition-
movement is mobilized and the dictator finds himself in the post-tipping regime.
As Figure 2 shows, the model then converges to the bad steady state, characterized
by heavy repression. The reason is that our dictator switches to the post-tipping policy
function (displayed in Figure 1) with a stock St > S
D (this is guaranteed by Case I’s
defining assumption that S∗ > SD). In that part of the state space, the bad steady state
is the stable point of attraction. Intuitively, our dictator has accumulated such a large
stock of wrongdoings that he fears retribution and has become “a prisoner of his own
past” who has crossed “a point of no return” (cf. the remarks that commentators have
made about Mugabe and Nkrumah in the Introduction and Appendix to this paper). All
the dictator can do is hope to avoid serious punishment by clinging on to power, even
though this requires additional wrongdoings on his behalf (namely exercising repression).
In this steady state, a high stock of wrongdoings S (which implies a high prospective
punishment Ψ(S) for the dictator) will be accompanied by heavy use of repression r (to
reduce p, so that Ψ(S) is unlikely to materialize). With the flow use of repression and
the stock of wrongdoings being complements, the dictator finds the established reduction
in pt worthwhile, despite the fact that his use of repression rt also adds to St+1 (which
increases his problems even further if he does get overthrown in the future). At this stage,
the dictator can live with being hated - as long as he is feared as well (recall Caligula’s
quote in the Introduction).
It is interesting to note that in our model, derailment of a dictator is unintentional,
yet voluntary and accompanied by ex-post regret (even though it results from rational
behavior): had the dictator known the exact location of S∗, he never would have started
the experimentation process and he never would have crossed this line. It is thus the
informational imperfection on the location of S∗ that opens up the possibility to accidental
derailment of the dictator.21
20This does require the dictator’s initial subjective belief to be sufficiently optimistic such that he puts
some prior probability on the possibility that S∗ > S
C
. Given that many dictators suffer from a feeling
of “grandiosity” (Coolidge and Segal, 2009), such (over-)confidence in their ability to get away with some
wrongdoings is likely to be present in reality.
21In this sense, our model is similar to the drug addiction-model of Orphanides and Zervos (1995): their
model produces drug addicts to whom addiction was unintentional and accompanied by ex-post regret. As
they note (p. 740), the crucial element to obtain this result is to do away with the assumption of perfect
foresight. Once that assumption is relaxed, models in which agents behave rationally can already produce
these kind of results. The same applies to our model: we have relaxed the perfect foresight-assumption
by introducing uncertainty on the location of S∗, as a result of which the dictator is uncertain on how
much wrongdoing he can actually get away with, which seems realistic.
17
Anecdotal evidence supports the notion of ex-post regret. In Holland (2008: 121),
Denis Norman (an Englishman who spent a total of twelve years in Robert Mugabe’s
cabinet, but subsequently distanced himself from the regime) recalls a private conversation
that he had with Mugabe in 2003 (during which Mugabe had little incentive to lie).
Norman asked him “Where did it all go wrong?”, to which Mugabe replied: “Things
aren’t what they used to be, are they?”. Mugabe subsequently reflected upon the trips
that he and Norman used to make across the country (before things got out of hand),
adding “Those were good days, weren’t they? I really enjoyed it all back then.”22
Finally, we would like to emphasize that it really is the interaction between the in-
formational imperfection on the location of S∗ and the complementarity between S and
r that is generating the behavioral transformation. Neither ingredient by itself would be
enough: without imperfect information there would be no experimentation and the dicta-
tor would never cross the Mogadishu line, while there would be no derailment if it wasn’t
for the complementarity. It is only as a result of the interaction that rational agents may
voluntarily choose to engage in actions that they might come to regret ex-post.
Case II: SD > S∗. Now consider Figure 3. This figure was generated using the
parameterization of Figure 2, only now S∗ < SD. As the two dashed lines in the top
panel of this figure show, the model would converge to the exact same steady states as
under Case I if the dictator either knew that there is no tipping point (the dashed line
converging to S
U
) or if he did expect a tipping point at a bounded location but the tipping
point happens to be non-binding (the dashed-circled line converging to S
C
).
The solid line in the top panel shows a typical simulation when the tipping point is
binding (S∗ < S
C
) and when the discontinuity SD is located to the right of the Mogadishu
line S∗ (S∗ < SD; this is the contrast with Case I). Here, the dictator learns the location
of the tipping point before his stock St has crossed the critical point at S
D. For the first
few periods, while in the pre-tipping regime, this dictator makes the exact same choices as
under Case I. But since the opposition now mobilizes relatively early (before the dictator
has accumulated a stock of wrongdoings which exceeds SD), it isn’t too late for him yet
to improve his behavior upon learning the location of S∗. Under this case, the dictator
switches to the post-tipping policy function with a stock St < S
D. In that area of the
22In Godwin (2010: 122), Mugabe’s personal chaplain characterizes him as an unhappy ruler as well.
Such discontent is also apparent in the private notes of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, who inherited a
repressive regime from his father, Alexander III . After Bloody Sunday (22 January, 1905), he wrote in
his personal diary: “A painful day. There have been serious disorders in St. Petersburg because workmen
wanted to come up to the Winter Palace. Troops had to open fire in several places in the city; there were
many killed and wounded. God, how painful and sad.”
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state space, the good steady state is the stable point of attraction (recall Figure 1). So
when S∗ < SD, the opposition manages to discipline the dictator. This kind of behavior
has been observed in reality around the cases of Jerry Rawlings and many others, who all
turned into moderate leaders after their rather unpromising starts were met with protests.
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Figure 3: Evolution of key variables when SD > S∗. Parameters as in Figure 1.
Note from the bottom panel of Figure 3 how in our baseline specification the dicta-
tor’s wrongdoings in the pre-tipping regime only consist of rent extraction (there is no
repression yet). As explained under Case I, this is due to our assumption that the dictator
is non-sadistic in a sense that he does not derive any direct benefits from repressing his
population. After all, the whole point of Case I was to show that even such a non-sadistic
ruler can develop into a repressive tyrant.
But as some of the “bad-turned-good”-examples mentioned in the Introduction and
Appendix arguably did show sadistic behavior during their early days (while Coolidge
and Segal (2009) offer psychological evidence that many dictators suffer from a sadistic
personality disorder), Figure 4 shows that the reverse is possible as well: even sadists can
19
be turned into behaving autocrats. We model sadism by modifying the dictator’s utility
function to u = log(ct) + ρ log(rt), with ρ > 0. As Figure 4’s bottom panel shows,
such a dictator starts repressing his population as of day 1 already (very much like Jerry
Rawlings), but he still ends up as a moderate leader because his unpromising start triggers
opposition before his stock of wrongdoings S has crossed the “point of no return”, SD.
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Figure 4: Evolution of key variables when SD > S∗ and ρ = 0.15. Other parameters as
in Figure 1.
Along these lines one should note that our model has nothing to say about the actual
democratization efforts that were undertaken in practice by Rawlings et al. (also see
Section 5 on this, as this is a logical extension for future research). Our model can
however explain why those regimes took the surprising step of moderating their use of
political violence and repression, which is the focus of this particular paper.
Leap-frogging As Figure 5 illustrates, our model even allows for the possibility of
leap-frogging. The figure simulates the behavior of two dictators, M and R. Let’s say
that these two dictators are concurrently running two different countries. The difference
20
however is that Dictator R is intrinsically less benevolent than M . In particular, we
assume that R’s preferences are less congruent with those of his citizens than M ’s, while
we also assume that R is sadistic (while M is assumed not to be). We model this by
setting R’s preferences equal to uR(ct, rt) = αR log(ct) + ρR log(rt), where αR > 1 (as a
result of which R is more inclined to extract rents from his country than M) and ρR > 0
(this turns R into a sadist, taking direct pleasure in repressing subordinates). M ’s utility
function on the other hand continues to be given by uM(ct, rt) = log(ct).
Another important difference is that we assume that the location of the Mogadishu
lines in the various countries is such that SDR > S
∗
R (as in Case II), while S
D
M < S
∗
M (so
Dictator M falls under Case I).23
As a result of αR > 1 and ρR > 0, Dictator R makes a rather unpromising start -
repressing his population from day 1 and extracting large rents from the country. But
because he comes to face significant opposition before his stock of wrongdoings has crossed
SD, he does not end up in the repressive equilibrium where a high stock S has to be
accompanied by heavy repression r, but is disciplined instead. Dictator M , on the other
hand, walks the reverse route: he makes the better start of the two, but stoops to a
heavy use of repression later on - his non-sadistic preferences notwithstanding. So despite
the fact that R’s preferences are “worse” than M ’s, and despite the fact that R makes a
rather unpromising start, he will still end up as the “better” autocrat. In this respect, our
model supports the wider notion that external circumstances are perhaps more important
in determining whether a particular individual will display “good” or “bad” behavior, than
intrinsic preferences.24
Leap-frogging does not seem to be merely a theoretical curiosity: when reading news-
paper accounts from the early 1980s, Jerry Rawlings is very much portrayed as the bad
guy, while Robert Mugabe was simultaneously being characterized as a relatively good
guy (even being considered for the Nobel Peace Prize). By the late 2000s, however, these
characterizations had flipped around: most of Mugabe’s international awards and hon-
ours had been revoked, while Rawlings suddenly found himself on the receiving end. Our
model is able to replicate such a reversal and suggests that it may have to do with the fact
23Such a difference in the location of the S∗’s could for example stem from a lower start-up cost for
the opposition-movement in R’s country, than in M ’s. Alternatively, it could also be driven by cultural
differences (Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2014), or by a difference in the geographical structure of the two
countries. As for example argued in Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2013), successful revolutions are
harder to organize in countries with isolated capital cities, as a result of which those countries will have
a higher S∗ (and dictators in those countries can get away with more wrongdoings, which is in line with
the empirical results reported by Campante et al.)
24In very different contexts, this idea is supported by many psychological experiments, such as the
Milgram Experiment and the Stanford Prison Experiment (see Milgram (1974) and Zimbardo (2007)).
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Figure 5: Evolution of key variables for Dictators M and R with αR = 1.1, ρR = 0.15,
βR = 0.99, δR = 0.35, and zR = 40. Other parameters as in Figure 1.
that Rawlings soon faced opposition when he started exercising repression, while Mugabe
initially managed to get away with his first wrongdoings (most notably “Gukurahundi”).
This, however, came back to haunt him later on.
Summarizing As this section has shown, our model implies that the mobilization
of anti-government opposition has the potential to bring about a significant change to
a dictator’s behavior - either for the better, or for the worse. This seems to be in line
with reality. Holland (2008: 87, 171) and Meredith (2009: Ch. 8) for example describe
how Mugabe’s regime became more repressive after he started to feel the opposition by
the Zimbabwean Movement for Democratic Change. The Movement’s leader at the time,
Morgan Tsvangirai, seems to agree with this assessment. He has stated that “the turning
point of Mugabe was when he lost an election for the first time, when he lost the support
of the people, when it dawned on him the people no longer supported him. Then he
22
became reactionary. He reacted to the people’s will by enforcing his will on the people.”25
Similarly, the derailments of Kwame Nkrumah and Ferdinand Marcos were triggered by
them having to repress anti-government protests. At the same time, dictators like Jerry
Rawlings, Kenneth Kaunda, Daniel arap Moi, and Chun Doo-hwan were disciplined by the
mobilization of protesters against their regimes, which is in line with our model-outcome
under Case II.
This also has the provocative implication that any dictator operating in our environ-
ment has the potential to end up as either a moderate leader, or as a vicious tyrant.
Interestingly, even non-sadistic individuals who have absolutely no preference for exercis-
ing repression per se can end up as repressive leaders (provided that their actions are not
fully congruent with the preferences of society, which seems to be the case in reality - es-
pecially for non-accountable regimes (Maskin and Tirole, 2004)). This shines a new light
upon Hannah Arendt’s concept of “the banality of evil”.26 Such a view is also highlighted
in Orizio (2004: 4) who quotes Ian McKellen as saying that “one of the few lessons I have
learned from studying people who do terrible things is that they are all too human. And
that we are all too capable of doing almost anything”.
Our model finally shows that something which at first sight appears to be a rather
minor non-congruence in preferences between the dictator and (a subset of) the public,
has the potential to escalate and lead to serious conflict. Depending on the nature of the
opposition, even a difference in religion could already be enough to form the necessary
friction. For example: when the Muslim Brotherhood took over power in Egypt by ousting
Hosni Mubarak, his well-regarded Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was sentenced
in absentia to 30 years imprisonment and an 8.6 million dollar fine for utilizing the
Finance Ministry’s printer for campaigning purposes, and his alleged personal use of
impounded cars. His trial lasted only 6 minutes and it is believed that Boutros Ghali’s
Coptic-Christian background played a role in his conviction.27 These examples could
make leaders who fear similar consequences more desperate in clinging on to power (even
if they have delivered high-quality work, as a result of which they should have nothing to
fear on objective legal grounds). When such leaders have the opportunity to do so, it may
even induce them to use repression in order to avoid an unfair trial. This actually seems
25See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/mugabe-celebrates-90th-birthday-zimbabwe-
international-pariah.
26In her report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt (1963) argues that ordinary people can already
commit serious atrocities if ordered to do so (Mulisch (1961) developed a comparable idea in his analysis
of the Eichmann-case, while Milgram’s (1974) “obedience experiment” provides some scientific evidence).
Our model has a similar implication, but - unlike the Arendt/Mulisch/Milgram thesis - ours does not
rely upon subordinates obeying orders. Instead, our model focuses on the banality of evil at the very top.
27See http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Egypt-revolution-Mubarak-Ghali/2012/02/07/id/428738.
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to have occurred in Bahrein, where King Hamad (who has, by most economic standards,
done quite well for his country since he came to power in 1999) recently repressed protests
that seemed at least partly motivated by religious differences (in Bahrein’s case a Sunni-
ruling family versus a Shia majority).28 Given that Hamad now has even more to worry
about if ousted, it is likely that he is willing to use repression again in the future to avoid
retribution for his past offenses.
4 Policy implications
Our model also carries several policy implications. First and foremost, our model points
towards the importance of accountability when it comes to disciplining leaders. In envi-
ronments where leaders are more accountable, S∗ will be lower such that any behavior
which is non-congruent with the preferences of society is sooner met with opposition. As
set out in Section 3, this decreases the risk that the leader of such a country will derail
(especially recall Case II). Along these lines, our model suggests that an increase in ac-
countability (or more generally, the development of institutions that improve information
flows and allow the public to voice their dissent) can be in the interest of both society
and the dictator (as it is able to prevent him from ending up at the model’s bad steady
state, where the dictator suffers as well).
Secondly, it is also interesting to analyze the model’s comparative statics with respect
to z, the amount of divertible funds available to a dictator for rent extraction or repres-
sion. Such income can stem from the reception of fungible development aid or from the
exploitation of natural resources. As noted by Besley and Persson (2011: 1425), there is
a large empirical literature documenting the impact of resource rents on repression and
civil wars, but theoretical work is scarce (Aslaksen and Torvik (2006), Acemoglu, Ticchi,
and Vindigni (2010), Besley and Persson (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Van der Ploeg
and Rohner (2012), and Van der Ploeg (2012) being some exceptions).
As shown by Figure 6, having a lower amount z of fungible resources available increases
the location of the critical level SD while simultaneously making the high-repression steady
state less repressive. Eventually, when z becomes low enough, this steady state even ceases
to exist. In that case, there is no risk of derailment anymore and the low-repression steady
state will be the unique (and stable) point of attraction. The reason for these comparative
statics is that when z is lower, the dictator is no longer able to finance the high amount
of repression that is necessary to sustain the very high-repression steady states.
28Cf. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14540571.
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The fact that the location of the critical point SD is decreasing in z implies that
dictators with access to more divertible funds, are more likely to derail and develop into
repressive tyrants. It simultaneously also worsens the bad steady state (note how the latter
shifts right when z increases). This suggests that the availability of fungible resources
without proper checks-and-balances (remember that we condition on the dictator being
non-accountable) is conducive to the derailment of leaders. This can be seen as a new
and complementary form of the “resource curse”.
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Figure 6: Impact of changes in z on the post-tipping policy function. Other parameters
as in Figure 1.
This prediction is consistent with some existing empirical work (even though the lit-
erature does not seem to have reached a broad consensus on this issue yet; cf. Cotet
and Tsui (2013)): Besley and Persson (2011) report that exogenous aid inflows result-
ing from either a natural disaster or UNSC-membership during the Cold War, raise the
probability of political violence. For resource income, Lei and Michaels (2014) find that
oilfield discoveries increase the likelihood of armed conflict, especially for countries that
have already seen such conflict in the decade before the discovery. This result could be
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due to our prediction that a dictator who has used violence in the past, is more likely to
use violence again in the future to avoid retribution for his past misdeeds. Finally, Wright
(2008) reports how dictators with shorter “time horizons” (for example because they face
a revolutionary threat) are more likely to abuse aid income as a means to stay in power.
The idea that the availability of divertible funds contributes to the derailment of dic-
tators, also lines up well with anecdotal evidence available for many of the aforementioned
examples. As discussed in the Appendix, Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghanaian government was
well-funded in the mid-1950s via the revenues generated from the duties on cocoa-exports.
Comparable conditions have been documented for the Philippines, Libya, and Romania.
Marcos’ regime in the Philippines benefitted in the early 1970s from a fourfold increase
in the price of copra (the country’s main export product), while Libya and Romania saw
its leaders (Gaddafi and Ceausescu) derail in the 1970s, when their governments were
well-endowed after having profited from increases in the oil price (with Libya being an
oil producer and Romania managing to generate “hard currency” during the oil crisis
by exporting refined petroleum products; cf. Roper (2000: 55)). Similarly, it has been
reported that Mugabe’s government uses revenues generated by the exploitation of dia-
mond fields for repressive purposes (giving rise to so-called “blood diamonds”, see Human
Rights Watch (2009)).
An analogous pattern can be observed around fungible resources stemming from devel-
opment aid: Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup (which signaled the beginning of his repressive
days) took place less than a year after Peru had received a low-interest rate IMF-loan
(Hudson, 1993: 174), while Robert Mugabe’s behavior first deteriorated during the 1980s
- a decade in which his government was well-funded thanks to large aid inflows.29 These
aid inflows were meant to reward Mugabe for his benevolent behavior. Paradoxically, our
model however implies that through this reward-system, Mugabe’s promising start may
actually have contributed to his subsequent derailment (also see Meredith (2009: 81) who
recounts how Mugabe abused aid donations for purposes of repression).
At the same time, Daniel arap Moi’s rule of Kenya became less repressive after the US
reduced their aid flows to Moi’s regime once it had become of less strategic interest follow-
ing the collapse of the USSR.30 This suggests that policies aimed at limiting the amount
of fungible resources available to a non-accountable ruler can be useful. The reason is
twofold: not only can they reduce the probability with which a dictator derails in the first
29From 1979 to 1984, foreign aid to Zimbabwe increased by a factor 32 (measured in 2011 dollars, it
went from 26 to 849 million dollars according to World Bank data). Over the same five year period, aid
to neighboring and similarly-populated Angola only doubled (it went from 120 to 285 million dollars).
30According to World Bank data, aid to Kenya fell from 2 billion dollars in 1989 to 442 million in 1999
(all measured in 2011 dollars) - a reduction of more than 75 percent.
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place, but they might also be able to liberate a country from the bad, repressive steady
state. Cuts in the amount of fungible development aid provided to a non-accountable
regime, as well as trade-sanctions, could fulfill such a role.
5 Discussion
This paper constitutes a first step in providing an answer to an intriguing and important
question: why have some promising, seemingly well-intentioned rulers turned into dreaded
tyrants, while some ruthless dictators have made the opposite journey? Several important
matters are left for future research. Most notably, our paper is very much focused at
modeling the behavior of a dictator in the face of a novel complementarity (that between
his stock of wrongdoings and his flow use of repression) and studying its interaction with
the experimentation-process associated with the dictator’s imperfect foresight. These
elements have been neglected by earlier studies, but our novel focus comes at the expense
of a less refined representation of the institutional environment. Our model for example
abstracts from the intricate issues relating to the collective-action problems associated
with opposition-mobilizations,31 while it also takes the form of government (dictatorship)
as given. Consequently, it would be interesting to model the institutional framework as
well and investigate under what conditions autocrats can be made willing to share power.
This is the focus of Acemoglu and Robinson (1999, 2000, 2001, 2006), among others, and
it could be worthwhile to combine elements of such models with those of ours.
Additionally, the model’s suggestion that derailed, repressive dictators are rather un-
happy and suffer from ex-post regret (recall the discussion around footnotes 21 and 22)
implies that they could in principle be persuaded to step down voluntarily, since it should
be possible to offer them an outside option that is better than their (poor) status quo
as an unhappy dictator. History indeed suggests that this at least was the case: there
are many examples of repressive autocrats who chose to step down after being offered an
asylum or amnesty escape option - enabling their country to install a new leader. Some
notable examples include Idi Amin, Mengistu Haile Mariam, and Ferdinand Marcos, but
numerous other cases are discussed in Larcom, Sarr, and Willems (2014).
Recently, however, the international community has moved to an institutional frame-
work (centered around the International Criminal Court, henceforth “ICC”, established in
2002 and based in The Hague) in which such amnesty/asylum-abdication deals are going
31Cf. footnote 10. Also see a recent related paper by Gilli and Li (2014), which develops a further
refinement by distinguishing between two groups that are able to launch a revolution: the ordinary
citizenry and the “selectorate” (an elite group that holds the effective power to choose the leader).
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to be made less easily. The background-presence of the ICC might make it more difficult
to remove repressive dictators (despite the fact that they are unhappy) as the potential
prospect of having to stand trial makes them less keen to relinquish power. This allegedly
prevented Mugabe from abdicating after facing electoral defeat in 2008. While Mugabe
was reportedly ready to step down, his generals persuaded him otherwise as they feared an
ICC-prosecution. One of Mugabe’s lieutenants was quoted as saying that “[t]he Old Man
is staying, because I’m not ending up in The Hague.”32 What followed was an extremely
violent period during which Zimbabweans had to suffer from both hyperinflation as well
as a civil war accompanied by gross human rights violations.
On the positive side, the presence of the ICC holds the potential to discipline dictators
and to deter them ex ante. Consequently, it is a priori not clear whether the recent
move by the international community has indeed been counterproductive or not. Larcom,
Sarr, and Willems (2014) analyze this issue in a simple two-period setup and it could be
interesting to analyze a similar question using the framework developed in the present
paper (which models the dictator’s behavior in greater detail).
6 Conclusion
By the worst means, the worst. For mine own good,
All causes shall give way. I am in blood
Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,
Returning were as tedious as go o’er.
William Shakespeare, Macbeth.
In this paper, we have developed a model that can explain the observed phenomenon
of dictators who, despite making a promising and seemingly well-intentioned start, end
up as dreaded tyrants - and vice versa. We have shown that such mutations can result
from, what at first sight appears to be, a rather minor non-congruence in preferences
between the dictator and (part of) the population - for example stemming from a lack
of accountability. The reason is that this initial imperfection can be greatly amplified
through the complementarity in the dictator’s stock of wrongdoings and his flow use of
repression: when the population considers a dictator to have committed wrongs in the
past, the dictator fears being overthrown as that may lead to corresponding punishment.
32See theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/when-justice-stands-in-the-way-of-a-dictators-departure/ ar-
ticle623912/. Also see Godwin (2010: 122) who quotes his personal chaplain as saying in 2008 that “the
Old Man is tired, he wants to go, but there are others around him who will not let him step down”.
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Consequently, such a dictator becomes more willing to commit further wrongs (in the
form of exercising repression) to reduce the probability of being ousted and punished (a
channel that Shakespeare already alluded to in Macbeth, see the above epigraph). This
complementarity leads to the emergence of two steady states: one where repression is low
and one where repression is high. In the latter steady state the dictator actually suffers
from ex-post regret, which begs the question how it is possible that he ever ended up
there. This is ultimately due to the fact that our dictator has imperfect information on
his ability to “get away” with non-congruent actions. As a result, he may become inclined
to experiment and see how far he can push his own interests – even though this entails
the risk that he may end up going too far, in which case he sees himself converging to the
repressive steady state. Hereby, our model can give rise to both sudden deteriorations in
behavior, as well as to sudden improvements.
In line with many of the historical accounts discussed in the Introduction, either
development in our model is triggered by the mobilization of an opposition-movement
against the incumbent. If this movement starts while the dictator’s stock of wrongdoings
is still low enough, the dictator is disciplined (as for example happened to Ghana’s Jerry
Rawlings). But if the dictator’s stock of wrongdoings has crossed some critical level by
the time the opposition mobilizes, a complete derailment of the dictator results and the
model ends up in a bad steady state where repression is high (cf. the case of Robert
Mugabe and Zimbabwe).
Interestingly, these results imply that anyone rising to power in our model-environment
has the potential to end up as a repressive tyrant - even a non-sadistic individual who
has no desire for repression per se (provided that his actions are not fully congruent
with the preferences of society, which seems to be a rather mild proviso - especially for
non-accountable regimes). It furthermore shows that the actions of a dictator early on
in his tenure do not have to correlate very strongly with his later behavior (even if his
preferences remain stable). Few people would have predicted the derailment of Robert
Mugabe when he was considered for the Nobel Peace Prize in the early 1980s, and yet
this is exactly what has happened.
Finally, our model implies that dictators are more likely to derail when they have
more divertible funds available. This identifies a risk associated with the popular policy
of rewarding well-behaving (but non-accountable) rulers with fungible aid inflows (as
happened with Mugabe) and forms a new possible manifestation of the resource curse.
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8 Appendix
As claimed in the Introduction, there are many more examples of promising leaders who
later turned into vicious dictators. Here we describe some additional cases:
• Caligula: when he accepted the powers of Principate in 37 AD, he made a promising
start by reintroducing elections for magistrates, by aiding those who lost property in
fires, and by recalling Senators who were unjustly sent into exile by his predecessor
Tiberius.33 But some two years into his reign, Caligula turned into one of the most
vicious and oppressive dictators that the Roman Empire would ever see.34 “Let them
hate me, as long as they fear me” allegedly became his motto. While some scholars
hypothesize that only a mental illness can be to blame for this mutation, others
disagree and believe that Caligula remained a rational and calculating individual
throughout (see Winterling (2011)). In this paper, we will indeed show that it does
not take a mental illness to bring about such a remarkable deterioration in behavior.
• Kwame Nkrumah: after gaining a PhD from the LSE, returning home and serving
time as a political prisoner, Nkrumah was elected Prime Minister of Gold Coast
(present day Ghana) in 1952. His successful policies (which included the construc-
tion of many schools and hospitals, and nearly doubling the country’s literacy rate)
made him very popular. However, from 1954 onwards, things started to change:
when cocoa prices rose from £150 to £450 per ton, Nkrumah refused to pass any
of the gain on to farmers - increasing export duties instead. This policy of rent ex-
traction led to bloody clashes and riots, which Nkrumah answered with repression.
In 1958 he passed a law that allowed imprisonment without trial, while he declared
himself “President for life” in 1964. When he was overthrown in 1966, this was
greeted with great enthusiasm among the Ghanaian population. Back then, The
New York Times reflected on the excesses of his dictatorship and concluded that
Nkrumah had at some stage crossed “a point of no return”.
• Bashar al-Assad: succeeding his father as President of Syria in 2000, this London-
trained eye doctor made a promising start. He released over 600 political prisoners,
33The Roman historian Flavius Josephus wrote that Caligula “administered the Empire quite high-
mindedly during the first and second years of his reign. By exercising moderation he made great advances
in popularity both with the Romans themselves and with their subjects” (Antiquitates Judaicae (18.256)).
34Grabsky (1997, Ch. 3) attributes a similar development to Nero (who ruled from 54 to 68 AD): while
he did very well for the Roman Empire in the first five years of his reign, Nero subsequently faced violent
protests - sparked by the tax increases that he implemented to finance the construction of his “Golden
House”. This allegedly turned him into an oppressive tyrant.
34
closed the notorious “Mezzeh prison” (turning it into an institute for historical sci-
ence), and relaxed limits to freedom of expression by tolerating critical media and
permitting the use of mobile phones and internet. Consequently, many observers
spoke of the “Damascus Spring” (cf. Human Rights Watch (2007, Ch. 3)). This
Spring however turned out to be short-lived, as the regime had turned more repres-
sive than ever by 2005.35 With the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Assad’s
behavior has continued to worsen (the suspected use of chemical weapons against
his own population in 2013 is only one example of this).
While the above list is far from exhaustive (similar deteriorations in behavior have been
attributed to Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, to Alberto Fujimori of Peru, to Muammar
Gaddafi of Libya, and to Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines), one can also find more
examples of individuals who have followed the trajectory of Jerry Rawlings (improving
behavior during the course of their tenure):
• Kenneth Kaunda: upon taking power in Zambia in 1964, Kaunda unveiled himself as
a repressive autocrat. By 1972 he had transformed Zambia into a one-party state and
from 1976 onwards he governed through emergency rule. During the 1980s, however,
swayed by anti-government demonstrations, Kaunda became less repressive and in
1990 he even legalized opposition parties. After losing the multiparty 1991 election,
Kaunda peacefully handed power to the election-winner Frederick Chiluba. Since
then, Kaunda has received many awards for his contributions towards Zambian
development, including numerous honorary doctorates, the second Ubuntu Award
(the first recipient being Nelson Mandela), and the African President-in-Residence
Fellowship at Boston University. Commenting upon that honour, The New York
Times wrote on November 13, 2002 that Kaunda “would not have been eligible
if the fellowship had been around thirty years ago, around the time he banned
multiparty politics. Over the years, however, he became a democrat.”
• Daniel arap Moi: his Presidency of Kenya can also be divided in two parts. The early
period from 1978 until 1991 is typically characterized as a time of heavy corruption
and repression, while the later phase from 1992 until 2002 is seen as a period during
which his behavior improved: he reduced the amount of repression, restored the
multiparty system, and loosened restrictions on freedom of speech. Being barred
from reelection in 2002 (by his own 1992 constitutional change), Moi chose not to
amend the constitution but gave his support to Uhuru Kenyatta instead. When
35See e.g. “The Enigma of Damascus” in The New York Times of July 10, 2005.
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the latter faced electoral defeat by Mwai Kibaki, Moi transferred power peacefully
nevertheless. The improvement in Moi’s behavior is attributed to a combination of
both internal resistance (most notably the “Saba Saba uprising” of July 1990), as
well as to reduced US support for Moi’s anti-communist regime (which became of
less strategic interest after the collapse of the USSR; see e.g. FES (2003)).
• Chun Doo-hwan: upon taking power in South Korea through a coup in 1979, Gen-
eral Chun’s early days were extremely brutal. He imposed martial law, banned all
political activity, and censored the media. In 1980, Chun oversaw the “Gwangju
massacre”, where several hundred protesters were killed by government troops. Sub-
sequently, his behaviour improved: he lifted martial law in 1981 and wrote a new
constitution limiting the President’s term to 7 years. In the following year he re-
moved a longstanding curfew, released political prisoners, and lifted the ban on po-
litical activities. These moves led to a resurrection of violent activism, but this time
Chun relied upon riot police rather than the military to deal with the protesters,
thereby avoiding another massacre (Kim, 2007). Adhering to his own constitu-
tion, Chun stepped down in 1988 and transferred power to the election-winner Roe
Tae-woo, who became South Korea’s first democratically elected President.
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